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THE WRECK OF THE OLD 77
A Requiem Review of Equity Interests In
Railroad Reorganizations Under The Bankruptcy Act
WILLIAM POLATSEK

I
"Courts of Equity have a tradition of aiding the helpless,
such as Infants, Idiots, and Drunkards. The average security
holder in a corporate reorganization is of like kind."'
-Jerome Frank
A railroad wreck is almost inevitably a most melancholy thing.
"Almost" is used advisedly, for one of the most colossal wrecks of recent
years promises to have a reasonably happy ending. In this wreck, no
lives were lost and no injuries were sustained, although the conditions
that caused the wreck were responsible for the loss of untold millions
of dollars. The victim is Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, derailed
for all practical purposes by the Railroad Adjustment Act of 1948. As
a result of this happy catastrophe, that forlorn and forgotten man in
railroad reorganizations, the average holder of railroad equities, now
appears to have a reasonable prospect of survival. It is the purpose of
this discussion to examine the past condition of this newly nascent
equity holder, rather than to analyze his defender and champion, the
new Act, in the hope that a better appreciation of the equity position
may be reached in applying the new legislation.
The financial reorganization of a great railroad system as practiced
heretofore presents both economic and legal problems of monumental
complexity. Previous treatment of financially ailing roads fell into
two classifications-the equity receivership cure, and the Section 77
proceeding of the Federal Bankruptcy Act. Both left a great deal to be
desired. Inasmuch as most contemporary reorganizations have been
effected under the latter law, this article will be limited to the analysis
of the status of the share and shareholder from the vantage point of
Section 77. For the sake of convenience, the legal and administrative
aspects of the problem will be discussed first, and the economic considerations will be covered subsequently, insofar as the two may be
separable.
1 Frank, Some Realisti Reflections on Some Aspects of Corporate Reorganization, 19
VA. L. REv. 541, 569 (1933). Labor's interest is discussed by Whitney, Labor's Interest in
Railroad Reorganization, 7 LAW & Conmisz. PROB. 486 (1940).
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Section 77 in the Courts

As with any statute, the final interpretation of the Bankruptcy Act
rests with the courts. Whatever uncertainty existed in the past with
respect to the status of the equity-and for a time many questions remained unanswered-it has been firmly resolved by relatively recent
decisions.' The controversies over the scope of the Commission's jurisdiction, what constitutes the proper basis for the capitalization of the
new company, and the merits of the relative priority theory versus the
absolute priority theory3 are now settled.
Basis of Controlling Decisions
For the purposes of the railroad stockholder, three cardinal princiciples (among others of lesser import) have emerged from the Supreme
Court:
(1) The absolute priority rule is now firmly settled.4
(2) The capitalization of the new company shall be determined primarily by the consideration of the road's probable prospective
earnings.5
(3) The ICC has sweeping discretion to determine all matters pertaining to the financial structures of bankrupt railroads in Section 77
proceedings. The Commission's findings are binding on the courts, ex2 See Jackson, The Impact of the Western Pacific and St. Paul Decisions on Railroad
Equities, AS CoRp. tEORG. & A.m. BAiR. REV. 259 (1944).
3 Relative priority is a theory of income position rather than a theory of priority of

principal. Voluminous comment is available, but perhaps the best general discussion

is Bonbright and Bergeman, Two Rival Theories of Priority Rights of Security Holders
in a Corporate Reorganization, 28 CoL. L. REv. 127 (1928). The insistence on strict priority among classes of bondholders inter sese, and all of them over stockholders, which
usually interferes with the conservation of going-concern values, and the problem of getting the company back on its feet as a going concern, are two ideals which come to
grips over the treatment of stockholders. For an analysis of this see Foster, ConflictL. J. 923 (1935); Guthmann, Absolute Priority
ing Ideals for Reorganization, 44 YAar
in Reorganization: Some Defects in a Supreme Court Doctrine, 45 CoL. L. REv. 739
(1945). Guthmann asserts that the absolute priority rule works a serious injustice to
stockholders and junior claimants generally, and makes a plea for reasonable treatment
of risk-takers.
4 First laid down in the Boyd case, 228 U. S. 482 (1913), before the § 77 cases. For
reorganization cases, see In re Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. R., 124 F. 2d 754 (C. C. A. 7th
1942), aff'd in part and rev'd in part (absolute priority aff'd), Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. R., 318 U. S. 523 (1942), rehearing denied, Group
of Institutional Investors v. Abrams, 318 U. S. 803 (1942).
5 In re Denver & R. G. W. R. R., 150 F. 2d 28 (C. C. A. 10th 1945), rev'd, Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Thompson, 328 U. S. 495 (1946), and Insurance Group Committee v. Denver & R. G. W. R. R., 329 U. S. 607 (1947); In re St. Louis Southwestern
Ry., 53 F. Supp. 914 (E. D. Mo. 1944), cert. denied, 329 U. S. 775 (1946), reheaiing
denied, 331 U. S. 870 (1946); In re St. Louis, San Francisco Ry., 59 F. Supp. 417 (E. D.
Mo. 1945), cert. denied, 329 U. S. 775 (1946), rehearing denied, 329 U. S. 820 (1946),
and citations note 4 supra. The Rio Grande cases are minutely discussed in Notes, 14
CHICAuo L. REv. 84 (1946), 60 HARV. L. REV. 291 (1946), 32 VA. L. REv. 660, 1048 (1946).

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 34

cept for review on matters of law alone, or for clearly unreasonable
exercise of discretion.6
Other significant conclusions of the courts are that the statute
demands that operation of the roads be continued for the benefit of the
public, regardless of the interests of creditors and stockholders; 7 that
a basic requirement of any reorganization is to give the new company
a reasonable prospect for survival; 8 that such a reorganization contemplates the scaling down of claims and that security holders may take a
substantial loss, the procedure not being one designed to recoup losses; 9
that the statute was intended to remedy the evils of the old equity receiverships;" ° that Section 77 is not a composition statute in the sense
that business must be preserved to existing stockholders; 1' and that
elimination of valueless interests of shareholders and creditors by the
ICC is in accordance with the Act."2 This last rule raises the immediate contention that the holding, in effect, is that an administrative body
may determine a value, on the basis of which private property rights
could be wiped out- without any effective review by the courts. I do
not apprehend that this contention is untrue; nor do I feel it is one
wkich is radically new or startling.
"A statute will not be held to violate the due process clause
merely because it modifies or even destroys rights of private property, and this is true as to contracts, including corporate securities."' 3
With regard to the three major policies previously enumerated:
(1) The doctrine of absolute priority was first laid down before
the Section 77 cases, in the Boyd case,:4 but over the years there tended
to be a drift away from that principle.'5 The Los Angeles Lumber Cor6 In
Pacific
Canton
318 U.

re Chicago & N. W. Ry., 121 F. 2d 791 (C. C. A. 7th 1941); Ecker v. Western
R. R., 318 U. S. 448 (1942), rehearing denied, 318 U. S. 803 (1942); Akron,
& Youngstown Ry. v. Hagenbuch, 128 F. 2d 932 (C. C. A. 6th 1942), cert. denied,
S. 794 (1942); In re Missouri Pac. R. R., 39 F. Supp. 436 (E. D. Mo. 1941),

aff'd, 134 F. 2d 139 (C. C. A. 8th 1943), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 785 (1943). See cases
cited in note 4 supra, and the Rio Grande cases, note S supra.
7 In re Denver & R. G. W. R. R., 38 F. Supp. 106 (D. Colo. 1940), cert. denied, 328
U. S. 867 (1943).

8 Rio Grande cases, note 5 supra.
9 In re Denver & R. G. W. R. R., 38 F. Supp. 106 (D. Colo..1940), cert. denied, 328
U. S. 867 (1943).
10 New England Coal and Coke Co. v. Rutland R. R., 143 F. 2d 179 (C. C. A. 2d
1.944).
11 In re Chicago G. W. Ry., 29 F. Supp. 149 (N. D. Ill. 1939).
12 Ecker v. Western Pacific R. R., 318 U. S. 448 (1942).
13 Hand and Cummings, The Railroad Modification Law, 48 CoL.. L. REv. 689, 709 (1948).
A collection of U. S. Supreme Court cases, some of vintage quality and upholding the
assertion quoted above, is to be found in footnotes 60 and 61 of the article.
14 Northern Pacific Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482 (1913).
15 Probably due to a dictum in the Boyd case permitting shareholder participation
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panty case 16 resuscitated it, and now the absolute priority principle must
be applied whether the road is solvent or insolvent.' 7 Neither the courts
nor the ICC is permitted to give the stockholders anything if the
debtor's assets are less than the aggregate of its debts.1 8 The holders
of senior securities must be compensated in full before any value will
be recognized for holders of interests of lesser dignity. 9 This means
full equitable compensation, and not necessarily full dollar compensaV 0
tion for the face value of the securities held.
(2) In formulating a reorganization plan, earning capacity is the
essential criterion. This rule has been repeatedly insisted upon, and
the financial structure of the new company is very largely determined
by capitalizing the probable prospective earnings. It usually results
in a considerably smaller capitalization. With very few exceptions, the
most notable one being the Erie, the new structures have been too
small to accommodate the claims of prior interests and leave anything
for the old equity. Consideration is given, however, to other factors,'
including original cost and reproduction cost new, according to the
published reports of the Commission. In practice these "other factors" are generally given lip service and as a practical matter they are
relatively unimportant in determining the new capitalization. This
under certain conditions. Frank, Some Realistic Reflections on Some Aspects of Corporate Reorganization, 19 VA. L. Rav. 541 et seq. (1933); see Spaeth and Winks, The Boyd

Case and Sec. 77, 32 IL. L. REv. 769 (1938).
"Many courts took a realistic view of the reorganization problem and by sheer neces-

sity to accofplish a result thought practical and agreeable with the rehabilitation object
of the statute, have confirmed plans that have not followed strictly the rule of the
Boyd case. . . ." Swanstrom, Stockholder's Participationin Reorganization, 28 GEO. L. J.
336, 338 (1939). Also it seems 'Probable that one of the strongest reasons for disregard of the Boyd and Kansas City Terminal cases lies in the double edged nature of
provisions concerning voting rights of the shareholder and creditor." Note, Fairness of
Reorganization Plans: The Bondholder Pays, 31 IiL. L. RE v. 505, 517 (1936).
16 Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U. S. 106 (1939). See Dodd, The
Los Angeles Lumber Products Company Case and Its Implications, 53 HAv. L. REv.
713 (1940).
17 But cf. the United Light and Power case: Otis & Co. v. SEC, 323 U. S. 624 (1945).
This involved a solvent utility other than a railroad. The rule is modified by this decision.
Here, the SEC held that where on a basis of book value there was no equity available
for the common but where earnings exceeded the preferred dividend requirements, and

future earnings pointed to further improvements, the possibility that eventually there
might be dividends available for the common entitled it to participation in the new
company. This principle has not yet been applied to railroads, but might conceivably
be in the future. For two good analyses, see Sonnenschein, An Analysis of the United

Light and Power Case, A6 CoRP. REORG. &Ai, BANKR. REv. 35 (1945); Note, The Absolute
Priority Rule and the United Light and Power Case, 31 VA. L. REV. 928 (1945).
18 See note 4 supra.

19 In re Alabama, Tennessee &Northern Ry., 47 F. Supp. 694 (S.D.Ala, 1942), cited
.6l ..T .. TT_.
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avoids the expensive and inconclusive engineering valuations of properties necessary when new capitalization is based solely on original cost
or reproduction cost 22 It mirrors the economically classic theory of

investment; if someone must lose, historically the shareholder trades
security for the risks of greater profit? Put simply, if the earnings

of the new company are going to be only $1,000 per year, it isdifficult
to justify a capitalization of $10,000,000 merely on the ground that it

would cost the latter sum to reproduce the plant new.
(3) The ICC has, for all practical purposes, carte blanche in determining policy and details of the new capital structure, who shall

participate init,and to what extent, Thus the Commission exclusive-

ly determines the amount and character of the capitalization, the distribution and allocation of new securities24 (and may override state laws
inthis respect),25 all questions pertaining to the valuation of the prop-

erties, whether or not the plan iswithin the public interest, the ratio
of debt to stock, the amount of fixed and contingent interest,26 and

matters pertaining to the issue of warrants to old shareholders.2 The
courts are limited to correcting the ICC's errors of law, setting aside
findings of fact not supported by the evidence, and revising conclusions

which violate constitutional rights.2 They must exercise an independent judgment 29 but their powers are negative." They can veto a
plan which does not follow legal standards. 3 They can improve it only
by suggestion. 82
22 The valuation of the New York Telephone Company took ten years to complete.
Seven different parties submitted valuations, all different. The valuations of two competent independent corporate appraisers differed by $100,000,000. P. T. Homan, in a
course on public control of business, Cornell University (1947).
23 This, of course, is not per se a desirable practice or an economically realistic one.
Thompson, Respective Rights of Preferred and Common Stockholders in Surplus Profits,
19 MicHr. L. REv. 463 (1921).
24 Ether v. Western Pacific R. R., 318 U. S. 448 (1943).
25 In re New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 147 F. 2d 40 (C. C. A. 2d 1945), cert. denied,
325 U. S. 884 (1945) ; Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R..,
325 U. S. 884 (1944).
26 Ecker v. Western Pacific R. R., 318 U. S. 448 (1943).
27 In re Erie R. R., 37 F. Supp. 237 (N. D. Ohio 1940), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 748

(1943).
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The Commission has very wide authority. Accordingly, the shareholders must turn to it to discover how their rights are determined.
A detailed analysis of 36 railroads in Section 77 reorganizations, shows
the ICC has seven major aims:
(1) The restoration of the road's credit is a paramount objective.
The Commission must parcel out sacrifices and preside as mortician
at the interment of the old financial structure. To avoid a repetition
of these requiems, the reorganized company must be made financially
viable insofar as possible, and this cannot be accomplished until the
road can establish a decent credit standing.
(2) Simplification of the capital structures will be effected. Undue
diversity of security issues will not be tolerated. Complex financial
structures have been the demon incarnate of railroad reorganizations,
plaguing the ICC and the courts, especially in allocating new securities.88 The new capitalizations eliminate the haphazard patchwork of
innumerable security classes.8"
(3) Of the security classes that will be permitted, a rough balance
tends to be 25% fixed debt, 25% contingent or income debt,
25% preferred stock, and .25% common stock.a Variations in this proportion reflect the peculiar circumstances of individual roads.8 6
(4) The millstone of heavy bond finance will be substantially lessened. In the 36 reorganizations analyzed, fixed charges37 which were
3 The reason for this is due to the historical development of the railroads. Big systems,
such as the Pennsylvania and the Baltimore and Ohio, represent the absorption of scores
of small lines by one means or another. Securities were assumed, exchanged, and otherwise shuffled about. See Barriger, The Development of Railway Corporate Structures,
7 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 367 (1940). Pennsylvania has 151 companies in its system,
and the B. & 0. has 122.
For the principles and mechanics of security distribution, see Friendly and Tondel,
The Relative Treatment of Securities in Railroad Reorganizations Under Section 77, 7
LAw & CoNTErnP. PRoB. 420 (1940); Note, Distribution of Securities in Corporate Reorganization, 51 YALE L. J. 85 (1941).
34 "A well balanced financial structure requires that a substantial part of the new
capitalization be represented by capital stock, and not be represented in too great proportion by bonds, whether the interest be fixed or contingent, since control of the management of the property should be in the hands of persons holding a substantial part
of the entire interest in the property." St. Louis-Southwestern Ry. Reorganization, 252
I.C.C. 325, 335 (1942), approved, 53 F. Supp. 914 (E. D. Mo. 1944), cert. denied, 330
U. S. 836 (1947), rehearing denied, 331 U. S. 870 (1947).
35 For the terms and conditions of the stock and bond issues, and the "rather distinct
patterns" they follow, see Stevens, Railway Financing, 1890-1940, NATIONAL RsouRxes
PLANNMlG BOARD, TRANsPORTATIoN AwD NATIONAL Ponzcy, pt. I, § V (1942).
86 This pattern is undergoing a certain erosion, because the tax disadvantages attaching to preferred stock are tending to diminish its importance. Stevens, 9 J. or Bus.
OF TuE UNIV. OF Cm. 211 (1936).
87 The limitation-of-charges philosophy of the Commission is concisely expressed byCommissioner Mahaffle in his dissent in the Chicago, Great Western case: "We must find
that the probable earnings of the property, in the light of its earnings experience and
all other relevant facts, will provide adequate coverage for its fixed charges." 228 I.C.C.
585, 630 (1938). On fixed charges generally, see Moore, Railroad Fixed Charges in
Bankruptcy Proceedings, 47 J. PoL. EcoN. 100 (1939).
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comfortably earned with at least a 25% margin during the average
depression years were approved in almost every case. Contingent
charges such as debentures were usually limited to the difference
between the fixed charges and the maximum earnings estimated for the
prospective normal year. 8
(5) Provision is made in most plans for gradual retirement of debt,
the most frequently used device being the sinking fund. This is of
special interest to shareholders for it removes the preferred and common shares from participation in the earnings of the new company
by the amount of the fund.3 9 Retirement ultimately benefits the shareholder, as the value of the equity increases with the reduction in bonded
obligations. Roads have commonly met maturities by refunding them.
At least one writer has pointed out the fallacy of the view that regards
payment of debt by the incurring of another, i.e., refunding, as somehow providing a way out of debt difficulties.4"
The Commission apparently favors a plan which provides
(6)
reserve
account to cover extraordinary expenses, an "Improvefor a
ment and Betterment Fund." By the time the railroad has reached insolvency, the condition of the physical plant has not infrequently
reached the stage where efficient operation is impossible and is downright unsafe. The company will go the limit to meet its maturities and
interest payments, using money that would normally go into maintenance. This is known as "deferred maintenance"-the genteel way of
41
saying that the property is allowed to fall apart.
The objectives of such a fund are twofold: first, an attempt to prevent future deterioration of the plant by providing a source out of
which future maintenance expenditures may be made regularly, instead
of deferring them; and second, a specific method for financing new
capital improvements by some means other than issue of further debt
under an open-end mortgage-a step away from acquisitions by conditional sale on "terms."
38 The prime consideration of the Commission is that fixed charges shall be adequately covered out of earnings, as indicated in the Act. See Friendly, Amendment of the
Railroad Reorganization Act, 36 CoL. L. Rxv. 27 (1936). Stevens lists six specific
methods by which the expansion of fixed interest debt in approved plans may be restricted. 15 J. oF Bvswxss op T. UNIv. or CM. 205 (1942).
39 For a discu sion of these sinking funds at length, see Warner, Railroad Reorganization Practices and Policy, 20 SAVINGs BAzN J. No. 10, p. 7 (1939). An accounting problem is raised: the fund comes out of earnings, but is not available for distribution of
dividends. Thus, in one sense it is income, and in another sense, an expense.
40 MooRE, Tim REORGANIZATION Or RAtLROAD CoRPORATIoNs 101 (1941).
41 "Our maintenance of way is now down to the point where we are taking chances."
Letter of the President of the Frisco, quoted in Hearings before Committee on Interstate
Commerce on S. Res. 71, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 96 (1935), on the fact that the Frisco
experienced as many as 25 rail breaks per day.
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(7) Total capital structure will be limited to an amount not in
excess of the value of the property which has been determined by
the ICC.
Within these seven general aims, what are the determinants of the
new capitalization that lead the Commission to permit or deny participation of the old shareholders' equity in the reorganized company?42
43

1. Earnings
The ICC is concerned with earnings not only because they are
a salient determinant in the capitalization permissible, but also because they influence the nature and types of new securities offered.
The Commission has commented on this latter aspect in almost every
reorganization plan and its conclusions may be broadly summarized as
follows:
(a) The earnings will support a fixed debt amount only to the
extent that service on the debt can be assured in the worst years.4 4
(b) The earnings will support a contingent debt to the extent that
income bondholders may expect a return in average normal years.
(c) The preferred stock should pay in "good" years with a considerable degree of certainty.
(d) The common should pay in periods of high earnings.
What earnings are considered? The "earnings factor" in the new
capitalization generally refers to capitalization of the income available
for all the outstanding securities in a future normal year. This estimated figure is reached by a consideration of past and present earnings
within the context of the carrier's general economic position. Warner45
notes that the difficulties in adequately gauging future earnings are
innumerable, and that at best the capitalization labors under the burden
47
of human fallibility.4" The Commission would be first to admit it.
The proper base period to be used is a very sensitive matter,48 and
42 For ICC statement on criteria governing new capitalization, see Missouri Pacific
Reorganization, 257 I.C.C. 479, 522-23 (1944). Cf. Swaine, A Decade of Railroad Reorganization Under Section 77 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act, 56 HAnv. L. Rav. 1193
(1943). This article is an excellent general survey. For historical development, see
Bonbright, RAILROAD CAPIT.LZAATiox (1920).
43 See text at p. 533.; Anderson, U. S. Supreme Court Rule of Valuation as Applied to Corporate Reorganization, 27 MARQ. L. Ray. 111 (1943). The new capitalization, which should reflect the value for reorganization purposes, is composed of two
factors: the reasonable prospective earnings, and the rate of capitalization.
44 Usually by at least a 25% margin. See text at p. 537.
45 Warner, Some Financial and Economic Problems in Railroad Recapitalizations,
7 LAW & CONTEMm. PROB. 438, 442 (1940).
46 Id. at 441.
47 Missouri Pacific Reorganization, 257 I.C.C. 479, 525 (1944).
48 Most of the debtor's plans, and especially in the Ecker case, show that the base
period is strikingly different from the one used by the Commission. The charge is
made that the Commission is pervaded by a depression psychology because the base
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the Commission has insisted that the base period be of sufficient scope
to reflect operations in both good and adverse times.49 Present earnings are considered only as they fit into the long-run picture. 0 The
Commission then tentatively proceeds to estimate future earnings after
considering an extensive study of the future traffic potential the road
may expect, the territory the line serves and whether or not it is developing, any possible operating economies the road may obtain by
modernizing, the extent of the competition, and the future of properties producing "other income," i.e., income from non-operating holdings.5 1
The question of precisely what revenues should be included in the
earnings figure to be capitalized is troublesome. To cite a single illustration: joint facility rentals are not included. They reflect property
that is used but not owned. Such matters involve controversies over
accounting procedure outside the scope of this paper.
2. Rate of Capitalization
I have scoured the finance dockets of the ICC in vain for a statement of policy on this. A study of 36 railroad reorganizations reveals
that the rate of capitalization has averaged about 44%.52 The usual

range is from 4% to 5%. The utilities, by way of contrast, are allowed
about an 8% return, which they have no trouble earning. The railroads
are fortunate if they earn 4Y4 %.
While earnings are of major importance, they do not constitute the
sole criterion in setting up the new structure.5 5 The criticism that no
consistent relation of capitalization to earnings exists54 perhaps overlooks the fact that the earnings test is not by itself conclusive.
period it tends to use leans toward the 1930's and accords less weight to prosperity
income.
40 Frequently emphasized. E.g., the Missouri Pacific Reorganization, 237 I.C.C. 479,

'523 (1944).

5O'See dissent in Chicago, G. W. R. R. Reorganization, 228 I.C.C. 585, 630 (1938)
and the Missouri Pacific Reorganization, 257 I.C.C. 479 (1944). In the Ecker case,
war-swollen earnings were excluded from the long run earnings picture and disregarded
in the consideration of the road's probable earning capacity.
51
E.g., income from lessee railroads, from real estate holdings such as New York
Central's property on Park Avenue in New York City, and from investments.
52 The mathematical average obtained by totalling the capitalization rates (where stated)
in 36 reorganizations under § 77 and dividing by the number of cases. No rates were
found under 3% and none in excess of 5%.
63 See Chicago Great Western Reorganization, 228 I.C.C. 585, 612 et seq. (1938):
"But other factors should be given appropriate consideration."

54 For an analysis, see an excellent Note, Valuation and Capitalization of Railroads in

Reorganizations, 54 HARV. L. REV. "655 (1941).
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3. Valuation of the Property5
The value of the road for rate-making purposes is always a thorny
problem. Perhaps the most frequently voiced complaint against the
ICC is that in reorganization cases it has consistently refused to evolve
any general principles of valuation56 since the enactment of Section 77,
and that it has not proclaimed any definite formulae that might be
universally applied.57 It follows a policy wherein "lines are pricked
out by gradual approach and contact of decisions on opposing sides."5 8
Much of the confusion concerning valuation results from a failure
to distinguish between "value" for reorganization purposes and "value"
for rate-making purposes. The contention that the two are the same
was expressly disapproved by the Commission in the Rock Island
55 Prof. Bonbright of Columbia has done extensive work on the subject of valuation,
and his writings are perhaps most authoritative. Other works include Bourne, Findings
of Value in Railroad Reorganizations, 51 YALE L. J. 1057 (1942), a general treatment;
and Note, Valuation and Capitalization of Railroads in Reorganization, 54 HARv. L. RaV.
655 (1941). The latter suggests that the capitalization of a reorganized railroad should
equal the value of the assets it takes over. That value should be determined by what the
road can earn in the future, and past earnings indicate the soundest basis for determining future earnings. This article also charges that the ICC has failed to evolve any
principles of valuation since the passage of § 77 and amendments. Cf. with valuation
under § 77(b) for corporations other than railroads: Note, Method of Valuation for
Insolvency to Determine Stockholder's Rights to Participation,36 COL. L. REv. 1166 (1936).
See also Hale, two excellent articles, The Fair Value Merry Go Round, 33 ILL. L. Rlv.
517 (1939), and Conflicting Judicial Criteria of Utility Rates, 38 COL. L. REV. 959 (1938).
These articles clarify the persistent confusion over the rates-based-on-value to valuebased-on-rates circle. Cf. note 66 infra.
56 Note, Valuation and Capitalization of Railroads in Reorganizations, 54 HA~v. L.
REy. 655 (1941. Spaeth and Windle, Valuation of Railroads Under Sec. 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, 32 ILL. L. Rav. 517 (1938), assert that the ICC has tolerated dilatory methods of participants and that it has failed to enunciate standards by which it is prepared to
judge the plans submitted with respect to valuation.
57 W. H. Moore, of the American Council on Public Affairs, Robert Swaine, prominent member of the reorganization bar, Prof. Scharfman, the leading authority on the
ICC, and late Commissioner Eastman of the ICC have all commented in their various
writings on this policy of the Commission, and recommend a more clearly defined statement of principles. However, in the Ecker case, the Court held that the Commission was
not required to formalize in specific findings the data on which it relies, and the reasons
which underlie its expert opinion need not be marshaled and labeled as findings. This
ruling is unfortunate.
58 Mr Justice Holmes in Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 112 (1911).
"While it is easy to say what theory the Commission rejected, it is not so easy to define
precisely the theory that has been adopted." Friendly and Tondel, The Relative Treatment of Securities in Railroad Reorganizations under Section 77, 7 LAw & CONTEIP. PRoa.
420, 423 (1940). A most interesting contrast to the Ecker decision holding that specific
findings need not be formalized is found in SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194 (1947),
in which Justice Murphy said:
". .. we emphasized . . . a fundamental rule of administrative law. That rule
is to the effect that a reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment
which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency. . . . We also emphasized . . . an important corollary of the foregoing rule. If the administrative
action is to be tested by the basis upon which it purports to rest, that basis must be
set forth with such clarity as to be understandable. It will not do for a court to
be compelled to guess at the theory underlying the agency's action; nor can a court
be expected to chisel that which must be precise from what the agency has left vague
and indecisive." Id. at 196.
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for reorganization

"... as the actual worth of the properties to their owners, and
basically it is dependent upon the present and prospective earning
power of the properties considering . . . the amount of business
available,... the competition,... and the condition of the facilities

which make up the physical properties."
The rate-making value is defined as being that amount
"4... upon which the owners of the property are entitled, under the

Constitution, to an opportunity to earn a reasonable return, an
opportunity of which they cannot be deprived by public regulation
if confiscation is to be avoided."
That the rate-making value ordinarily will differ from "value" in its
strict economic meaning is noted:
".. . for example, it may not be possible to earn a reasonable

return upon 'value for rate-making purposes' even if public regulation allows the carrier a free hand in the making of its rates and
charges. On the other hand it may be higher, if the carrier... can
earn more than a areasonable return upon 'value for rate-making
purposes .... ) 59
The ICC has not stated how much weight it gives the value for ratemaking purposes in determining the value for reorganization purposes.
In the Special Master's report in the Erie case,"0 it is noted that
"The Commission, however, is not required under the statute to
make any formal or precise findings of fact, nor is it required to
adopt any precise formula which accords specific weights to the
different factors which may be considered in determining a proper
capitalization. Hence a complete statement of the grounds of its
determination is not essential. U. S. v. B. & R. R. (1935) 293 U. S.
454, 464. In the absence of a showing to the contrary, it may not
be assumed that the Commission failed to give appropriate consideration to all of the relevant facts."
Also in the Erie case, note that
"The Commission, in its reports, does not expressly adopt or
reject any of the evidence on the subject of valuation and, save
for ...

earnings ...

,

the grounds of its determination are not set

forth."
59 247 I.C.C. 533 (1941).
59' Chicago, G. W. R. R., 247 I.C.C. 193, 196 (1941).
60 Erie Reorganization, ICC Finance Docket 11915 (Submission of Plan of Reorganiza-

tion) p. 104 (1941).
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Assuming earnings to be the primary test, the irrelevance of ratemaking value in reorganizations is illustrated by the following example:
Earnings capitalized @ 5%
Earnings
indicate capitalization of
per year
$8,000,000
Road A $400,000.
$4,500,000
Road B $225,000.

Valuation for Ratemaking Purposes
$10,000,000
$10,000,000

While both roads have identical rate-making values, reflecting physical
plants equivalent cost-wise, Road B because of light traffice density
and adverse operating conditions due to terrain, can earn only 56%
as much as road A. Clearly, B cannot support a capitalization of
eight million without facing another insolvency.
Yet under Section 77 (e), the rate-making value must be considered
by the Commission. It gives it lip service,61 but I know of only
five cases6" where the ICC capitalization of a reorganized road under
Section 77 equals or exceeds the value for rate-making purposes. The
Rio Grande valuation for rate-making is about $178 million; postreorganization capitalization totals $152.4 million. In the Monon case,
rate-making value is about $38 million; new capitalization, $34 million. The primary reason why many carriers are forced into bankruptcy
is simply that they have not been able to earn a reasonable rate of return on their rate-making value, not because of Commission fiat, but because of competition or a dearth of traffic due to the vicissitudes of the
business cycle.
The elements determining rate-making value are:63
(a) original cost of the properties; (b) reproduction cost new; (c)
present value of land; (d) extent to which the properties have depreciated; (e) cost of additions and betterments.
4.

Other Factors

While Section 77 provides for consideration of the reproduction
cost, original cost, and actual investment,6 4 the Supreme Court in the
Milwaukee case held these items were subordinate to earnings, 5 but
did not elaborate as to how much weight should be given these other
costs. It said this was a matter for the Commission. The Commission
has not indicated the relative weights it gives to these costs as against
01

See text at p. 539.

62 The Akron, Canton & Youngstown has a capitalization 10% over the ICC valuation

for rate making; the Chicago & Eastern Illinois, a 20% overage; the Missouri Pacific,
15%; the St. 'Louis Southwestern, 21%; and the Spokane International, 1%.
63 247 I.C.C. 533 (1941).
64 Subsection (e).
65 318 U. S. 523, 540 (1943).
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earnings." In a study of the 36 roads, in some instances the "other"
costs have been found to be entirely beyond what prudence would
have dictated, as in the Missouri Pacific case; but generally the "other"
costs have set the upper limit of new capitalization where it appears
that this factor was roughly equivalent t6 the capitalized earnings.
The precise relation of earnings to "other" costs can not be reduced
to a formula. The weight accorded "other" costs seems to be best regarded
as limiting the maximum capitalization.17 (This policy with regard to
the importance of original and reproduction costs is in marked contrast
to those prevalent in the electric and gas utility fields.)
Two other general features are considered by the Commission, although the ICC does not specifically state that it considers them. The
first is one of those imponderables that cannot be reduced to precise
terms, and that is the nature and character of the management of the
road. This bears on the profitability of railroad operations and affects
future earnings. The administrative abuses of railroad management,
particularly in the field of finance, have caused much regulatory legislation. The effect of management on the road's earnings is perhaps best
illustrated by Lowenthal's add castigation of the equity receivership
of the Milwaukee in 1928. 68
The Commission has stated that one of the four important and indispensable factors in railroad organization is management, and that
it calls for a high degree of specialization. 9 The implication is that
those who operate banks or insurance companies with a high degree of
success are not necessarily those who can do the same thing with
a railroad.
The Commission's attitude toward management has been endorsed
by at least one court in very strong language indeed. In the Rio Grande
case, District Judge Symes said:
"The new management of the property should be made up of
Western men familiar with the problems of the customers living
in the territory served by the railroad. Its control as in the past
should not be centered in a group of financial institutions in New
66 "That . . . regulatory bodies are now free to depart from . . . the 'moribund formula' of Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466 is dearly evident. . . ." 56 ICC ANNuAL REPORT
92 (1942), quoting Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Driscoll v. Edison Light and Power Co.,
307 U. S. 104 (1939).

67 Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville Ry. Co. Reorganization, ICC Finance Docket
10294 (Submission of Plan of Reorganization) p. 94, citing cases.
68 LowENTAL,, THE INVESTOR PAYS (1933).

This book is a "behind the scenes"

ex-

pos& of the Milwaukee reorganization of 1928 under the old equity receivership
procedure. This infamous case played a highly prominent part in fanning the demand
for a reorganization method not subject to such flagrant abuse as the equity proceeding,
and resulted eventually in the enactment of § 77.
69 Fort Worth and Denver City Ry. Co. Lease, 247 I. C. C. 127 (1941).
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York City, the officers of which have never willingly ventured west
of the Hudson River, and who set foot for the first time on their
property when invited on an inspection trip by the Trustees."7"
(Italics added).
The matter concerns the equity, because at least in theory the
equity is the management; and the Commission's feelings on the subject must bear at least indirectly on their attitude toward the equity's
participation in reorganization.
Consideration may also be given to taxes;" to the effect of permissible rates, such .as favorable or unfavorable rate differentials; 72 the
effect of rising costs, principally wages; 3 the character of the physical
facilities of the road,74 present and contemplated; and "any other
relevant facts," for example, the effect of new routes available and the
75
relation thereof to costs and earnings of the carrier.
From all this data, the Commission must fit together the new capitalization; a structure that will be "in the public interest" and that will
be "fair and equitable," as well as adjust the rights of the security
holders so as to fit the old holders into the new company within the
statutory requirements.
The status of the railroad share interest in reorganizations can be
appreciated only when viewed in the proper perspective, and this requires consideration not only of the judicial and administrative aspects
which have been briefly outlined up to this point, but the share interest
in the light of the general economic setting of the industry," and in the
light of the internal relation of the share with the bondholders.
70 In the Matter of D. & R. G. W. Ry., Debtor, U. S. D. C. (Colorado) Oct. 25, 1943.
(Reported in ICC Finance Docket 11002, Submission of Plan of Reorganization, p.
187 at 198).
71 All plans treat taxes due and unpaid as a prior claim. Taxes are a fixed charge,
and as such the tax load is of necessity a part of the consideration of fixed charges
in every plan, from the point of view of whether the road's earnings will support a
structure having a given amount of bonded debt in excess of other fixed charges such
as interest, rents, etc.
72 Rutland R. R. Reorganization, ICC Finance Docket 14635 (Submission of Plan of
Reorganization) p. 20, (mimeographed; not yet published). Parenthetically it may be
noted that the constitutionality of the rate differential between the North and South has
been opened to serious question in Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. R., 324 U. S. 439 (1944).
73 Rutland case, note 72 supra.
74 Chicago, Indianapolis '& Louisville Ry. Co. Reorganization, ICC Finance Docket 10294
(Submission of Plan of Reorganization) p. 94, citing cases. Almost all cases consider deferred
maintenance.
75 E.g., the development of the Dotsero cut-off and the Moffat Tunnel in the Rio
Grande case, 328 U. S. 495 (1946). This issue is a major consideration in merger and
consolidation cases. See Nickel Plate Unification, 105 I. C. C. 425 (1926).
76 Corporate reorganization is in the first instance a problem of readjusting legal
promises to conform to economic substance, and legal changes are dominated by
economic factors. The strict priority rule is not necessarily sound economically. Field,
Valuation for Purposes of Corporate Reorganization, 16 Rocxy MT. LAw Ray. 13 (1943).

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 34

Let us now examine some of these economic matters that bear so
directly on the problem.
II
Equity and the Bondholders
The relationship of the equity to the secured creditors in a reorganization bears some inspection, both internally, as private rights are compromised, and externally, as the ICC and the courts apply external
regulation to the relative claims and rights. The problems divide themselves into: (a) the issue of management and control of the properties;
(b) the shareholder as a source of capital; (c) the problem of the
creditor who becomes a shareholder by exercising an option on a convertible bond, or by the ICC's allocating the junior lienor equities in
the new company, where the absolute priority rule precludes him from
an interest of greater dignity.
(a) It can scarcely be denied that control of the management of the
road is an asset, although not of a type that can be reduced to a tangible
value with ease.77 Under the absolute priority rule, this asset should
be offered to senior claimants before it is tendered to the stockholders,
yet it has been noted that this procedure was not followed in many
major receiverships, such as the old equity receivership of the Milwaukee and more recent cases where the controlling interest in the debtor
was another railroad. Where the ICC has found the equity to be of
no value, the result has been, in theory, to unseat the old controlling
interests. But there is nothing to prevent bondholders from leaving
control of the road in the hands of the pre-reorganization management.
Undoubtedly a substantial proportion of the tremendous pressure
directed towards the salvage of the equity in reorganization emanated
from sources which were in a position to exercise control, rather than
from those who have had an altruistic concern for the small shareholder.
A major factor, therefore, has been the tenacity with which management in the saddle resists ouster. Among the evils of the old equity
procedure that Section 77 was designed to prevent was the elimination
of obstructive litigation on the part of junior interests. The "cramdown" provisions were partially directed toward this end. 79 However,
the obstructive powers of the stockholders could not be automatically
77 The views of the Commission on stock control are noted specifically in Nickel
Plate Unification, 105 I. C. C. 425, 444 (1926). For a general discussion see FREDERICK,
HERRING, AND H!pps, REGULATION or RAILROAD FINANCE, c. 2, The Acquistion of
Control of Carriers (1930).
78 MooRE, TnE REORGANIZATION Or RAILROAD CORPORATIONS 116-18 (1941).
79 Sec. 77 (f), 49 STAT. 920 (1935), 11 U. S. C. § 205 (f) (1946).
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eliminated, and it is quite likely that in many of the plans, concessions
are made to the equity in exchange for forbearance in opposing the
plan. 0 These concessions do not necessarily appear as such at the
time the plan is submitted. 81
(b) As a source of capital in providing new money, the stockholder
has been largely replaced by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.
When the old stockholders constituted the only source of funds, their
participation, although a clear violation of the absolute priority rule, was
dictated by expediency and condoned by the courts. - Under Section 77
proceedings, however, dissenting creditors need not necessarily be
bought off with cash; 3 also the road is freed of meeting its fixed charges
in cash while in reorganization. However, in times of depression such
as the 30's, which are the times when railroads fail, a real question
exists as to the possibility of securing funds from the equity. That
they would pay an assessment is tenuous; and whether or not they
could pay is a matter of conjecture. The argument that the equity
should participate because it constitutes the only source of new money
rests on a dubious rationale.
(c) The creditor who becomes a co-owner presents a problem concerning strictly legal rights. It also has certain social implications. The chief
method by which the creditor becomes a shareholder is by receiving
stock in the new company as compensation for a bond held in the old.
It applies generally to holders of junior issues secured by divisional
mortgages, who, in the determination of the Commission, are too low
in the priority scale to receive a portion of the secured issues of the
reorganized company. The Supreme Court, quoting with approval the
Commission's statement that "it is of great importance that a completely
unified system be created through the reorganization and that the
capital structure be not complicated by numerous mortgages,"' 4 has
found no constitutional bar to the conversion of debt into stock by this
80 "Reasons for making concessions to stockholders are many and various . . . "
(citing many others). Dodd, The Securities and Exchange Commission's Reform Program for Bankruptcy Reorganization, 38 COL. L. REv. 223 (1938).
81 It has been noted that "In a great railroad, if a man's directors are already in
possession, 10% is practical control. . . . Experience has demonstrated that you cannot
dislodge them, even where gross mismanagement is proven." Hearings before House
Jvdiciary Committee on the Clayton Act, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. Vol. 1 p. 820 (1914), as
cited in Regulation of Stock Ownership in Railroads, H. R. REP. No. 2789, 71st Cong.,
3d. Sess. I, 44

(1931).

82 Kansas City Term. Ry. v. Central Union Trust Co., 271 U. S. 445 (1925); see
Spaeth and Winks, The Boyd Case and Section 77. 32 ILL. L. REv. 769 (1938).
8 See note 79 supra.
84 In re Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. R., 124 F. 2d 754 (C. C. A. 7th 1942), aff'd
in part and rev'd in part (absolute priority aff'd), Group of Institutional Investors v.
Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. R., 318 U. S. 523 (1942), rehearing denied, Group of
Institutional Investors v. Abrams, 318 U. S. 803 (1943).
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Thus, the pages of guarantees and the fine legal exposition"6
of the security contained in a 250 page indenture is inevitably, in a
reorganization, compromised by the pressure of economic realities,
and the lender of money, who in the first instance bargained only for
the purposes of obtaining an investment return, finds himself as owner
of the properties.87 Carried through several reorganizations, as in the
case of the Western Pacific, bondholders once firmly entrenched can
be ushered right out to the street by the process of reducing their
claims in this manner-from bonds to lower grade bonds to stock to
"(no value in the equity."
The alternative, however, is a perpetuation of a structure that almost
certainly will lead to another bankruptcy." Refusing to sanction complex new structures requires occasional variations from the absolute
priority doctrine to fulfill its spirit. 9 A further factor that must be
considered in the debt-into-stock conversion is the possibility that control of the road will shift to the hands of competitive roads or into
financial circles; a circumstance not favored by either the ICC or the
method.8 5

courts.S0

The other method by which debt is transformed into equity is at
the holder's option. The issuance of convertibles in reorganizations
is surely aimed at the goal of an increasing dependence on stock as
85 Allocation of convertibles and other inferior issues to satisfy first priority claims
is not necessarily a violation of the absolute priority rule. On this point, known as
qualitative preference, as distinguished from quantitative preference, see Erie R. R. Co.
Reorganization, I.C.C. Finance Docket 11915 (Submission of Plan of Reorganization) p.
106 (1941), listing a collection of cases in the courts which approve the concept. In
other words, different classes of old security holders may be offered different amounts
of the same class of new securities without violating the absolute priority rule. See
Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. DuBois, 312 U. S. 510, 528 (1941).
88 "The refunding and improvement mortgage is a lien on all the properties covered
by the Erie First Consolidated mortgage, the Erie general mortgage, the Erie & Jersey
first mortgage, and the Genesee River first mortgage subject to the liens of those mortgages
and to all mortgages underlying those mortgages." Erie R. R. Co. Reorganization,
I. C. C. Finance Docket 11915 (Submission of Plan of Reorganization) p. 31 (1941). A
Philadelphia lawyer would despair of tracing the security underlying each issue.
87 See the institutional investor, discussed in the text at p. 551.
88 The recurrent reorganizations of the Milwaukee, the Rio Grande, and the Georgia
& Florida, are good examples of the result of perpetuating a structure having fixed
charges that cannot be supported by earnings.
89 Milwaukee Reorganization, I. C. C. Finance Docket 10882 (Submission of Plan
of Reorganization) p. 140 (1938); Missouri Pacific Reorganization, 239 I. C. C. 7, 95
%1940); Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Denver & R. G. W. R. R., 328 U. S. 495, 518
(1946).
90 "But the fact is that public authorities do recognize in the bonded debt a financial
claim against the public superior to that of the stockholders, regardless of the fact
that the latter has made an equal contribution to the common cause-indeed is often a
former bondholder who has been converted into a stockholder against his will." MouToN
et at., TnE AmRICAN TRANsPORTATION PROBLEM 294-95 (1933). The Commission, in the
Nickel Plate Unification case, 105 I. C. C. 425 (1926), indicated disfavor of any plan
in which those who control the road do not have a substantial beneficial ownership. For
specific disapproval of voting trusts see Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Reorganization,
131 I. C. C. 673, 697 (1928).
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a means of finance, and a move away from the rigidities of the fixed
interest bearing, definitely maturing bond. A possible objection from
existing shareholders that the exercise of the option by bond holders
dilutes the relative share of ownership can be answered by a reminder
that any diminution of the debt increases by that amount the interest
of the stockholders in the company." In voluntary adjustments, where
the cumbersome legal "remedies" of equity procedure or Section 77
are not invoked, 2 it is management-the equity-that promulgates the
plan, so it is unlikely that the plans will alter the stock interests9
The new Railroad Adjustment Act has now specifically sanctioned this
procedure.
A common justification for issuing securities with the conversion
feature is that this right aids in marketing the bond. However, an
income debenture that failed to earn its charges would hardly be an
attractive investment from the point of obtaining dividends, and, conversely, if the interest was covered and the income maintained, the
conversion feature would offer little incentive, unless the equity was
receiving fat dividends-a prospect, which, in the capital structure
theory of the Commission is not likely.9 4 I know of no case where the
equity's control has been materially altered by voluntary conversion
of bonds into voting stock. Most convertible issues have various
restrictions with respect to the voting rights of the securities after con-

version.
Equity and the Investor"
The railroad share has alternated as whipping boy and as court
favorite in the investor's fancy. From the wild gyrations of rail equities
in the great building periods preceding and following the war between
the states, and the even wilder gyrations characteristic of the days when
the rail barons were forming the great systems of today," rail stocks
have lost practically all of their gaudy speculative appeal as the industry has matured and as security regulation has increased. Railroad
91 For a discussion of the investment characteristics of railroad convertibles, see
& DODD, SECURITY ANALYSIS 284-329 (2d ed. 1940).
92 See text at p. 564.
93 Elaboration of this point is found in Will, The Voluntary Adjustment of Railroad
Obligations, 7 LAW & CONTEMM. PROB. 519, 526-27. (1940).
GRAnA.mR

94 See text at page 539.
95 For an excellent general reference for the investor in
PALRIER, INVEST]ENT SALvAGE n RARnoAD REORGANIZATIONS,

reorganization securities, see
(1938).

96 The classic example was the fight between Hill and Harriman for control of the

Northern Pacific. At one time the common stock touched $1000 per share. In earlier
days, the manipulations of Erie and New York Central stock caused tremendous price
variations on the Exchange.
struggles.

Numerous other accounts are available of these dramatic
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stocks have had investor appeal through the years because of their
high degree of leverage, due to the disproportionately small amount of
shares to the amount of bonds and senior securities inherent in most
of the rail capital structures. Thus, in periods of high business activity,
earnings flow rapidly to the equities, conversely, in depression the.leverage factor operates in reverse and income available to shareholders
vanishes rapidly.
From the investor's point of view, railroad reorganization has in
the long run been beneficial to railroad equities,9 7 but this result has
been reached by a cure that many will assert is more painful than the
malady-millions of dollars of stock found to have no value, millions
of dollars of hard-earned funds wiped out in the bankruptcies. The
only justification for this can be seen in merely stating the alternative
-perpetuation of top heavy capitalizations, and the years when the
shareholders would reap only a harvest of barren regrets.9" With the
drastic reduction of fixed charges that come prior to dividends, the
common and preferred shares of reorganized companies have a proportionately greater opportunity of participating in the distribution of
available funds, a result that is surely in the interests of the shareholders, the roads themselves, and the public. It is the rather ruthless
method whereby this result is achieved that has been the target of
D
bitter opposition. Yet the ICC expresses concern over small investors.
With the long term trend of personal income taxes moving in the
direction of higher and higher limits, profits from stock holdings have
lost some of their attractiveness. So called "double taxation" of
dividends operates in such a way that I doubt if the rate of return on
shares represents much more in the form of "take home" income than
the yield on a high grade bond. The investor is confronted with a
conflict of public policies which is in no way resolved-the demand and
need on one hand for heavy taxation of corporate profits and increasing demands on individual taxpayers; and the Commission policyapproved by the courts-of increased rail financing by the use of the
share. Interest on bonds may be deductible, while dividends on stock
are taxed, not once, but twice.
97 "Investors, particularly in bankrupt properties, should bear in mind that good credit
is essential to railroad success. They have more to hope from a reorganized property
which can face the future with good credit prospects than from one which gives greater
paper recognition to their claims at the cost of a sound financial structure." Eastman,
Transportation Problems and Suggestions toward a Constructive Solution, 17 AcAD. POL.
SCI. PROC. 239 (1938).

98 This view was strongly endorsed, in effect, in Consolidated Rock Products Co. v.
DuBois, 312 U. S. 510 (1941).
99 "There is a market for railroad securities among small investors today. Nothing
should be done to destroy this market or the machinery of distribution by which it is
reached." It re Competitive Bidding in Sale of Securities, 257 I. C. C. 129, 147 (1944).
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The leverage factor mentioned previously works to the disadvantage
of the non-expert investor for a high per-share return can conceal the
unsatisfactory basic condition in the industry. This is important for
rail shares are very widely held indeed. The small investor, who in
the final analysis knows little or nothing about the economies and
financing of railroads, 'finds himself owner of a worthless bit of paper,
when the equity is deemed valueless in a reorganization. This produces
a sort of mass "I've been swindled" attitude that eventually takes the
form of pressure for legislation to alleviate their plight.' 0 And yet
it is the equity, at least in theory, that manages the road and is responsible for contracting the very debts that eliminate their interest, through
excessive bond financing. Regardless of the illogic of their claim, their
attitude cannot be dismissed,' 01 for when the roads wish to finance
with stock, the market for rail shares will be ultimately in the hands of
the little fellow.
The institutional investor deserves special mention because of the
peculiar income requirements necessary to institutional enterprise.
Statutes prohibit insurance companies and banks from investing in
equities at all, or require equity standards that the rail shares cannot
possibly meet. Their investments demand first of all security, and
secondly, an orderly income due to the requirements of the long term
contracts of the insurance companies themselves. From this, Moore
concludes that by seeking to obtain greater stability than exists in
speculative business investment, the institutional investors have furnished a ready market for fixed income securities that railroad managements could not afford to ignore, °2
The institutional group are faced with serious complications if they
hold contingent interest bonds or stocks in lieu of original fixed interest
obligations, after the reorganization. 10 3 They presumably do not purchase bonds for the purpose of acquiring railroads as they are not in
the railroad business.
The railroads themselves have indulged in practices that would put
them in the category of institutional investors by purchasing their
100

See text at p. 564.

101 On purely logical grounds, these claims should be dismissed under the absolute

priority rule. But the ". . . conception of fairness in reorganization plans as a matter
susceptible of determination according to clear cut rules about legal priorities is an unrealistic one." Note, 39 Co.. L. Rav. 1030, 1031 n. 4 (1939).
102 MOORE, THE REORGANIZATION OF RAILROAD CoRPORATioNs 76 (1941).
103 "Securities dependent upon income for their return, or securities of like character,
cannot be held and they must be disposed of." Testimony of F. N. Oliver, counsel,
National Association of Mutual Savings Banks, Hearings before Committee on H. R. 6249,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 108 (1935). Cf. Garbutt, Vicissitudes of Railroad Credit, 83 TRuSTS
& EsTATzs 243 (1946), (relation of railroad credit to trustee's investments).
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own shares in the market during reorganization.'0 4 This practice was
carried to such an extent- that even the President felt called upon to
castigate it.1 5 Railroad's buying in their own bonds present certain
special problems, 0 6 not the least of which is the improvement of the
stockholder's relative position at the expense of the secured creditors, 101
when the bonds are bought in the market at a price far below par.

Economic Aspects of the Capital Structure
Within recent years the rationale of regulation has undergone a
shift; first from a fear of overcharges to support an excessive capitalization; then to a fear for the maintenance of adequate transportation;
and currently to concern over the part played by the financial structure
as it affects the general economic plight of the roads.' 8 As system
after system has been drawn hito the bankruptcy vortex, the evils of
fixed charges have become recognized as being the chief causative
agent.' 9 This realization leads in the direction of complete financing
by means of equity issues," 0 producing a structure with no bonded
indebtedness. Except in cases where the road has only the poorest
prospects of 'earnings, the elimination of all fixed debt in the capital
structure is a practice of debateable merit. With judicious utilization
of bonds, the equity may earn a return above the service on debt
through the use of capital furnished by bondholders."'
While it is perfectly apparent that the soundness of the capital
structure of a railroad cannot be appraised effectively solely by inspection of the ratios of stock to bonds"' or the ratio of these securities
104 Testimony of M. J. Cleary, President, North Western Mutual Life Insurance Co.,
Hearings before Committee on H. R. 6249, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 88 (1935). Lowenthal's expos6 of the part played in the Milwaukee reorganization of 1928 by the National
City Bank of New York, however, casts considerable doubt on the piety of such assertions by the institutional investors.
165 93 CONG. REC. 543 (1947). For analysis of this practice in the utility field, see Note,
Participationin Reorganizations under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935
of Preferred Stock Purchased by Controlling Interests During Reorganization Period,
10 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 979 (1942). Here, controlling shareholders acting as reorganization
managers are held to a fiduciary duty, and the SEC may deny fees as a deterrent to
breach of such duty-an admirable scheme. Cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 317 U. S. 80 (1943).
106 See Swaine, The Purchase by Railroads of Their Own, Obligations, 7 LAw &
CONTEmP. PROB. 532 (1940).
107 Note, Distribution of Securities in Corporate Reorganization, 51 YALE L. J. 85
(1941).
108 MooRE, THE REORGANIZATION or RAILROAD CoR'oRATIxoNs 69 (1941).
109 E.g., Chicago Great Western R. R. Reorganization, 228 I. C. C. 585, 630 (1938).
Commissioner Mahaffie, dissenting in part, states flatly that "The carrier is in trouble
because of its fixed charges." Id. at 630. For the effect of this on service, see text at p. 538
110 The Commission's plan for the Rutland is a case in point.
III GRAHAM & DODD, SECuRITY ANALYsIs 99 (2d ed. 1940).
112 See LocxLIN, THE EcouomIcs oP TRANSPORTATION 611 (1938), for merits and disadvantages of the stock-bond ratio as a measure of debt burden. GRAHAM & DODn,
SEcUrTY ANAI~sis 547-52 (2d ed. 1940), gives optimum ratios from the investment point
of view.
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to total capitalization, these ratios are nevertheless of material aid in
comparing the railroad capitalization with established standards of the
theoretical optimum structures investment analysts have determined
to be sound. For example, Graham and Dodd state that railroad debt
should not exceed that amount upon which fixed interest charges cannot be earned at least twice. Concurrently, the minimum ratio of stock
value to bonded debt (stock-value ratio) is shown as $1.00 of stock to
$1.50 of bonds."' It is interesting to note how these tested investment
standards compare with the 36 reorganized roads studied by the
writer." 4 The fixed charges times interest earned figures before reorganization for the best years of rail earnings prior to the war averaged 1.70,
whereas Graham and Dodd indicate a figure of 2 to be the safe
minimum. The Monon, with a coverage of 2.02 and the Wabash, with
a coverage of 2.12, are the only two roads that subsequently faced
bankruptcy that had their fixed charges covered at least twice. The
theoretical minimum coverage suggested by Graham and Dodd is highly
accurate when applied to the statistical facts of railroad earnings. The
bankrupt roads failed to earn the minimum safe coverage by an average margin of about 15%.
In contrast to the "ideal" ratio of $1.00 of stock to $1.50 of bonds,
the average of the 36 roads prior to reorganization was $1.00 of stock
to $1.81 of bonds, or 20% in excess of the minimum safe standard.15
It is strikingly apparent that had the equity been more rationally represented in the structures of the reorganized roads such widespread disparities from the safe "standard" would not have existed and such reorganization would have been unnecessary.
Thus far we have been concerned with the railroad share and reorganization from what may be termed the "internal" aspects; an
outline of the applicable law, the capitalization and its effect, the
relationships between the equity and other investors and security
holders. Behind all this lies the larger problem of railroad economics.
When all is said and done, the holder of railroad equities, whether the
road is solvent or in reorganization, will have his lot determined not
by legislative fiat operating through commissions, not by adjusting his
113

GRANA-m & DODD, SECURITY ANALYsIs (2d ed. 1940).
114 See table at the end of this article.
115 It should be noted that Graham and Dodd use the market value of the stock in
determining their ratio, and the table states the par value, hence the comparision is not
exactly parallel. However, use of the par or stated value in setting up the ratio is
more conservative. The market values of the reorganization shares were drastically lower
than their face value. Had the market value been used in the comparison, the ratio would
indicate a radically greater divergence from the minimum standard, possibly as high as
100% excess of bonds to the stock, instead of the 20% indicated by the more conservative use of face value.
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status with respect to his fellow security holders, and not by decisions
of the Supreme Court. It will be determined by the economic condition
of the roads themselves as a part of the national transportation system,
Accordingly, certain key postulates are apparent:
(1) The equity holder in a road emerging from reorganization
should face the fact that a real possibility exists that the railroads
will never again have the potential earning capacity they once enjoyed." 6 The complex of reasons that has resulted in this situation
is relatively unimportant except insofar as the equity can profit from
hindsight and, through management, attempt to prevent a reoccurrance
of the conditions that have caused the industry to suffer its economic
decline. The roads may be able to regain their relative competitive position through skilled generalship, but the factor over which the equity
exercises only negligible control is the rising floor of costs, chiefly material and wages, and the stable ceiling of rates, which the shipping
public wants, understandably, kept down. With the opportunity for
profit margins thus narrowed, the impact of a rigid debt structure can
have fatal results, even if traffic does not decline. Aside from liberalizing capital structures, this issue can be partially met by increased rationalization of existing plant.
(2) Rationalization of the existing plant does not imply Socialism or
nationalization of the. railroads, but it does imply economic integration of existing facilities to eliminate wasteful duplications and to avoid
intra-railroad competition of the internecine type. 117 Services which
inherently can best be performed by competing forms of transport should
be abandoned by the road and efforts made to attract new traffic
from existing sources. The financial success of the German system
before the advent of the Nazis shows that rationalization has a direct
bearing on the return to both senior ana junior security holders. The
rationalization of the British lines resulted in the public of England
having the most completely integrated transportation systems in the
world.

118

116 Stevens, Railway Financing, 1890-1940, 193 et seq., NATIoNAL REsouRcEs PLANNING
BoAa, TRANSrORTATioN & NATioNAL Pouicy, pt. I, § V (1942). See Commissioner Meyer,
dissenting in Associated Rys. Acquisition, 228 I. C. C. 277, 376-79 (1938).
117 "And this competition . . . consists largely of taking tonnage from each other,
and then taking it back." Sturgis, Transportation Development in the United States, 17
Acma. POL. Scr. PRoc. 215, 222 (1938). Cf. NATioNAL RESOURCES PLANNING BoARD,
TRANSpORTATOiN AND NATIoNAL PoucY 15 (1942). Duplication of terminal facilities is a
frequent example of the former, and the use of exorbitant rentals for trackage rights
illustrates the latter.
118 Hutchins, in class lectures in economic and business history, Cornell University
(1947). Prof. Hutchins asserts that had Britain's transportation system been as poorly
integrated as ours, it could never have done the job demanded by the war, under conditions of great shortages and extreme congestion, and might well have resulted in a
supply collapse that could have caused her defeat.
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(3) Both the stockholders and creditors of our railroads must
recognize that our national transportation policy, which is slowly
emerging from the planning stage to the action stage, will result eventually in a degree of rearrangement of traffic and services adversely affecting incomes of some individual roads in the interests of an over-all
increase in the efficiency of our transport system as a whole. The
National Resources Planning Board made an analytical survey of our
transport system, and in its report the Board indicated its concern over
the problem:
"This multiplication of overlapping services in fields of doubtful economy must, in the aggregate, account for a considerable
inflation of transportation cost above that which would result
The roads as a whole
from a more economic division of traffic ....
have not gone far enough in investigating new devices and improving purchasing, marketing, and operating methods. There is
clear need for development of a stronger cooperative spirit in the
railroad industry which will seek the solution of outstanding
problems on an industry basis, rather than from the restricted
It is certain that the trapoint of view of individual carriers ....
ditional policies of railroad finance do not fit the needs of the
present." (Italics added)."
It would be gratuitous to cite the numerous instances in which the
ICC has made it clear that precisely these matters are of major importance in the thinking and approach of the Commission, and particularly in the cases of reorganization of marginal roads' 2
The American system of transportation is governed on the economic
theory of regulated competition, in contrast to the control of public
service utilities, which is based on the theory of regulated monopoly.
An obvious incongruity in the transportation theory is the fact that the
railroads are placed at an economic disadvantage through the policy
of public subsidizing of competing forms of transport. All forms should
be put on the same basis, preferably the user basis 2 1 The roads, as
taxpayers, contribute to competing agencies that then use the money
to take business away from the roadsI --a fact that the railroad in119 NATIONAL RESOURCES PLANNING BOARD, TRANSPORTATION AND NATIONAL POLICY 7-8
(1942).

120 E.g., Associated Rys. Acquisition, 228 I. C. C. 378 (1938).
121 OWEN, NATIONAL RESOURCES PLANNING BOARD, TRANSPORTATION

AND NATIONAl. POLICY 277 (1942). In the same publication, R. L. Dewey comments on subsidies to com-

peting forms of transportation in his article, Government Ownership and Operation of

Railroads: "If, in fact rail earnings and credit are jeojardized by transport subsidies, it
may be true that the only feasible alternative to an impaired rail position is nationalization. . .

." Id.

at 279.

"An economic division of traffic between different forms of transport cannot be
brought about if a part of the costs of some transportation agencies is borne by the
taxpayer." LocxI N, THE ECONO3ICS or TRANSPORTATION 852 (1938).
122
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dustry never tires of pointing out. This puts the investor in the absurd
position of a man who is buying an ownership equity in a business and
by so doing indirectly contributes funds to agencies actively operating
to reduce his investment's earning power. Similarly, the creditor lends
money that is partially used to undermine the value of the loan's collateral security. 123 Further, the relative impact of taxation on railroads as compared with other carriers has been terrific. 4
Of particular significance to the shareholder of a bankrupt road is the
fact that taxes accrued and unpaid constitute, obviously, an obligation which must be met before the residuum (if any) can be allotted
to the equity.125 Taxes are, therefore, a factor in determining whether
or not a value exists in the equity for purposes of participation.1 26
Railway Credit
These considerations lead to a major economic problem of the railroads, and of railroads in reorganization in particular: the maintenance
of railway credit. 2 7 The cost of long term money to the industry is a

good indication of what the money market thinks the value of the earning power of the roads will be in the years ahead. What will this cost.
be? It is governed by two factors: the earnings prospects of the industry, and the policy of the Government that interest rates shall
remain low. From a study of the problem one economist has concluded
that if government interest rates remain around 2%, new railroad
bonds should average around 4%.12s He predicts that foreseeable net
earnings will be sufficient to attract private capital unconditionally to
finance equipment by equipment trust certificates; a probability that
only the stronger carriers can sell bonds; and that low profits will
preclude any substantial proportion of finance by sale of equities. 9
These conclusions raise serious implications in connection with the
123 A sad paradox indeed. Yet, for air transport, at least, military necessity dictates
a strong air transport system based ultimately on the commercial lines, and in order to
maintain the commercial system, some form of subsidy appears essential.
124 See Stevens, op. cit. supra note 35 at 175-83 for detailed discussion; Mou ToN et.
al., TnE AmERIcAN TRANSPORTATION PROBs, C. 11 (1933).
125 E.g., New York, N. H. & H. R. R. Reorganization, 257 I. C. C. 9, 27 (1944); Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Reorganization, 252 I. C. C. 525, 578 (1942).
126 In 1940, the Central of New Jersey earned only 69% of the New Jersey taxes
assessed on its properties. In other words, if all of its earnings had been applied to taxes
alone, the road would still have been shy 31% of meeting its tax bill, let alone meeting
annual interest charges. Under such conditions, bankruptcy for the Central was a guaranteed
certainty.
127 See text at p. 537.
128 Dewey, The Maintenance of Railroad Credit, 36 A.m. EcoN. REV. 451, 458 (1946).
129 Ibid.: "Net profits of most companies are not likely to be large enough to tempt
any but the most speculative investors." Yet stock issues should be the chief reliance of
railroads for new capital, according to MouLON et. al., THE A.aRIcA TRANsPORTATioN
PROBLEm

294 (1933).
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source of railroad credit. A possible straw in the wind was the inability
of the solvent Delaware & Hudson to float a $50 million issue in 1945
at competitive bidding.180 Only one bid was received for issues of four
other roads, including two carriers only recently reorganized. The
ICC was moved to say, "This experience suggests that the present available underwriting capital in this country is hardly sufficient to afford
effective competition on a very large issue."" 8' This certainly alludes
to the possibility of obtaining funds from outside private means. The
only other source is the Government. While the Government has aided
the roads before, there is a decided division of opinion as to the advisability of such a policy today, and it is not at all clear how this
matter will be resolved when the roads are confronted with it on a
large scale.3 2 While speaking of public attitudes, it should be noted
that the Commission is well aware of the sensitivity of railroad credit
to public reaction on issues pertaining to financial matters of the
roads.ls
The great imponderable with respect to rail credit is, of course, that
much depends on what the investing public thinks about the credit
risk of the roads, rather than what the risk actually is in terms of
Dun and Bradstreet. As long as the public buys rail issues readily, rail
credit is good. And, of course, the roads do not perform in an economic vacuum, but reflect the general business level, and the rails'
credit is related to business credit in industry.
One specific method of strengthening rail credit is in making railroad
capital structures more flexible. The Commission has been very careful in Section 77 reorganizations to insist upon this, as shown by the
more balanced structures that have emerged, the increasing use of income bonds and other contingent charges. Moulton's study concludes
that new capital for the roads should be acquired chiefly by the issue
Call
of stock.'3 4 Stevens advocates the use of participating bonds.3
130

57 ICC ANN. REP. 27 (1943).

re Competitive Bidding in Sale
of Securities, 257 I. C. C. 129 (1944), and 58 ICC ANN. REP. 15 (1944).
132 "The answer" according to Dewey, "depends upon government and public attitudes
toward the railroads." Dewey, The Maintenance of Railroad Credit, 36 Am. EcoN. REv.
451, 459 (1946).
1s E.g., at a recent hearing on a bill to amend § 77 the following ensued:
Q. "Are there any specific roads, or any specific maturities that make it imperative that this bill be passed at once, Mr. Mahaffie?"
A. Commissioner Mahafflie: "I think you will have some testimony from individual
railroads that feel the need of the bill. I would hesitate, if you will permit me, to
attempt to name the roads in need of relief at this time, or that may need it later. I
would hesitate to do that because of the possible effect on their credit."
Hearings before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, on H. R. 2298, 80tL
Cong., Ist Sess. 14-15 (1947).
184 MouLToN et al, THE AaSERICAN TRANSPORTATION PRoBLr 294 (1933).
185 Stevens, Railway Financing, 1890-1940, 194-95, NATIONAL REsouRcEs P'xVNo
131 For ICC policy on competitive bidding, see In
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provisions, convertible features, and limitations on accrual of interest
that cumulative issues are entitled to, are all methods pointed in the
direction of liberalizing the structure and improving credit. New legislation is directed in part towards the same end, without resorting to
the cumbersome bankrupcy reorganizations under Section 77.138
The Public Interest
The courts and the ICC consider every phase of a reorganization
from the primary approach of the public interest. The connotations
of thiat term are as familiar as a precise definition is impossible. 3 By
and large what is in the public interest in railroad reorganizations is
in practice what the ICC says it is. The basic consideration is, of
course, the maintenance of a swift, efficient, dependable transportation
service to the greatest number of people at the lowest cost consistent
with the achievement of this goal.
Two points remain to be clarified: first, if heavy bond finance is
not in the public interest, why have the roads persisted in this type
of financing; and secondly, does the elimination of the equity in so
many reorganizations support the conclusion that the ICC is partial
to the surrender of railroad properties to creditors at the expense of
investing ownership? Locklin states five reasons for the large proportion of borrowed capital to invested capital: 3 '
(1) The advantageous marketing conditions which exist for sale of
bonds to the institutional investor. Stocks are not legal investments
for institutional groups in most jurisdictions.
(2) Borrowing necessary capital is profitable: an addition may earn
1.2% on the additional capital needed to finance it, and if this capital
can be obtained for 4%, the equity is that much ahead.
(3) Legal obstacles prohibiting the issuance of stock below par
force the roads into bond issues.
(4) Bonds, especially collateral trust bonds, facilitate the acquisition of control of other carriers. The proceeds can be used to purchase the stock of the road to be acquired.
(5) It is easier to retain control of other roads. When new capital
for the subsidiaries is needed, bonds provide it and the controlling
BOARD, TRANSPORTATION * NATIONAL PoLicY, pt. I, § V (1942); see Participating Debt
versus Other Securities in Capital Structure Readjustments, 28 GEo. L. J. 1021, 1040-41.

(1940).

136 See text at p. 564.
137 MOORE, TuE REORGANIZATION OF RAILROAD CORPORATIONS

philosopher might very humbly shirk the responsibility
public interest."
138 Locx~iNL,

THE ECONOmqCS

Or TRANSPORTATION

610

156

(1941):

Indeed, "A

of determining what is the
(1938).
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company need not put up money to purchase voting shares as it would
in financing by a stock issue.
To these factors, Moore would add:
(6) "Complacent acceptance" of bond finance has been due to the
ideology of the quasi-guaranteed fair return, based on the fiction that
rail capital was essentially immutable-the ideal investment for widows
and orphans.
(7) This fiction encourages trading on the equity, because of the
great gains possible through the leverage provided by a small proportion of stock.
(8) Finally, Moore ascribes "the most pernicious combination of
circumstances which encourage bond financing of railroads is that . ..
it does not dilute control over the property, and (in effect) does not
disturb control when the bonds are defaulted upon." 140 The same management stays on.
Whatever the reasons are for such top-heavy financing methods, it
is perfectly apparent from the study of 36 reorganizations that the
Commission is well aware of the dangers inherent in this practice, and
that new capital structures will not be permitted if they are heavily

"bonded."M41
A fair question arises: The Commission has the exclusive power to
regulate the sale and issuance of securities by railroads.' 42 And it has
had the power for twenty-eight years, charged with the responsibility
of seeing that the issuance of securities will be in the public interest.
Now, if the Commission feels that the debt-ridden rigidity of railroad structures was a proximate cause of so many bankruptcies, how
is it that the Commission itself has authorized, in the public interest,
the issuance of so many securities of a character that causes the
rigidity? True, much of this debt represented refunding operations
at more favorable rates of interest, and of debt piled up prior to Commission jurisdiction over rail issues. But this is not entirely convincing; nor does it explain permitting the Wabash to issue $17 million
worth of 40 year income bonds unbacked by a sinking fund-a radical departure from announced policy; 143 or the approval of issuance
of $11 million of fixed interest bonds to furnish new money in the
Rock Island reorganization. 144 The complacency of the Commission in
permitting fixed debt to be issued may have been partially responsi139 MOORE, THE REORGANIZATION OF RAILROAD COORATiOoNs 163-66 (1941).
140 Id. at 164. The most striking example is the Milwaukee equity reorganization

of

1928.
141 See St. Louis, Southwestern Ry. Reorganization, 252 I. C. C. 325 (1942).
142 TRANSpoRTATo0 ACT OF 1920 § 20a, 41 STAT. 494 (1920), 49 U. S. C. § 20a (2) (1946).

143 Wabash Ry. Receivership, 247 I. C. C. 581, 619 (1941).
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ble for subsequent financial stringencies of the roads, but the roads
themselves initiate proposals to market securities-and the type of
security they wish to market. ICC approval does not mean the Commission is guaranteeing the bonds and is substituting its business judgment for that of management. Nonetheless, the Commission ought to
justify its actions. Would it not be "in the public interest" to do so?
The accusation has been that the Commission is pervaded by a
But the charge that the ICC exhibits certain
"debtor philosophy.""
partiality to bondholders at shareholders' expense, from the treatment
accorded the equity in past reorganizations is, I believe, without merit.
At various times the Commission has said:
"We are of the opinion that the best interests of the public and
by an early return (of the propthe security holders will be served
1 46
erties) to private management."'

"It should be borne in mind, I think, that the system of private
ownership and operation of railroads will not in the long run work
successfully, unless the stockholders, who are responsible for the
managements, have a real interest in the properties and are able
to derive a reasonable profit therefrom .... I believe that we should

either go in for public ownership and operation or play the game
of private ownership and operation according to the rules." 47
Numerous other instances might be cited. 48 While the Commission
has not hesitated to declare the equity valueless, it is evident that it
does so with reluctance.
The overriding public interest is the maintenance of service. The
effects of excessive debt finance are most apparent in service. 149 In the
desperate effort to meet the charges and 'maturities as they occur, expenses for operation are cut to the bone. Deferred maintenance piles
up, service is curtailed, and every penny over the actual costs of operating is poured into the fixed charge payments. This starts a vicious
cycle; service deteriorates to the point where shippers become disgusted,
traffic falls off, and service is then further curtailed. The evil day is
only postponed, and when it comes the property is sometimes little
144 Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Reorganization, 247 I. C. C. 533, 540 (1941).
145 See note 31 supra. However, the impartiality and fairness of the Commission is
universally conceded. It is probably the only major administrative agency that has
escaped accusations of partisanship, fraud, or collusion.
146 Wabash Ry. Receivership, 247 I. C. C. 581, 619 (1941).
147 See Spokane International Ry. Reorganization, 288 I. C. C. 387, 411 (1938)
(concurring opinion).
148 E.g., Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Reorganization, 131 1. C. C. 673, 697 (1928);
Nickel Plate Unification, 105 I. C. C. 425, 444 (1926).
149 Noted long before the advent of § 77. See BoNDEiGrr, RAnROAD CApTA MOTON
38-43 (1920); DAGGET, RAImRoAD REORGANIZATIONS (1908).
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President Barriger of the Monon, figures that
more than junk.'
$50 million will be needed to remake the properties into a first-class
system. 5 ' The significance of this figure is that the Commission's Bureau of Valuation reported the entire cost of reproduction new of the
properties to be about $47y million. 152
The effects of excessive bond finance can be summed up as follows:
(1) the physical deterioration of the properties reaches alarming proportions, necessitating huge rehabilitation expenditures;
(2) reorganization is only postponed; interest arrearages and principal defaults continue to mount;
(3) the value of shareholder's equity is reduced to zero;
(4) service to the public reaches rock bottom. Whatever else is
said about reorganizations and the Commission, financial structures
fostering these conditions will not be approved regardless of the size
of injury or financial loss to any particular group, and quite properly
so. "5 3 The losses to every group-creditors, investors, shareholders,
the public-reach a scale so appalling that Stevens has computed the
investor loss in 25 reorganizations in the period 1938-40 alone at over
$3.5 billion, and total market value losses in the period 1929-38 at
over $20 billion.'
Surely if the public interest demands anything, it
is that such situations not occur in the future.
Utility Recafitalizations
The suggestion has been made that the ICC should be more definitive
in its consideration of reorganizations,' 5 5 and that it would be helpful to counsel in particular and the public generally to have some idea
of its policies. Reference is made to the SEC and its announced prac150 The Monon, the Minneapolis and St. Louis, and the Frisco are fine examples. See
MooR, TnE REORGANIZATION OF RAmRoAD CORPORATiONs 70 (1941).
151 Railway Progress, May, 1947, p. 13.
152 Monon reorganization, p. 94.
153 In connection with the elimination of fixed interest bonds, it is well worth noting
the words of the district court judge in commenting on the plan:
"This problem directly involves the question as to whether the plan is compatible
with the public interest. . . . All fixed interest charges which now aggregate $1/2
million are eliminated. If the property should again be in need of judicial reorganization it will not be because of its inability to earn interest charges created or preserved by this plan." Igoe, In the Matter of C. I. & L. R., I.C.C. Finance Docket 10294
(1941).
154 Stevens, op cit. supra note 35 at 171-72.
155 Especially vigorous criticism has come from the reorganization bar. One authority
feels that the ICC should follow the custom of the SEC and "chart" principles that
counsel might rely on. See Swaine, Present Status of Railroad Reorganizations and
Legislation Affecting Them, 18 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 161 (1941). Part of the difficulty
he charges to § 77 in that it does not adequately distinguish between questions affecting
the public interest, such as aggregate capitalization and questions affecting private rights
of security holders. The former fall within the administrative jurisdiction, and the latter
within the judicial realm.
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tice of furnishing reliable guideposts, particularly in cases involving recapitalizations under Section 11 of the Public Utility Holding Company
Act.'56 There can be no doubt that these criticisms have merit, but I
would object to the comparison of SEC and ICC practice in this
respect:
First, a true basis of comparison between railroad reorganizations and
utility recapitalizations under the PUHCA is difficult if not impossible.
No common denominator can be found between Section 11 and Section 77. Fundamental differences exist in the purposes of the two
acts.O1 7 In the one case, legislative fiat has decreed that the profits of
a healthy enterprise be divided, and the enterprise operated henceforth
as a group of smaller units; in the other, the idea is to salvage the
skeleton of an enterprise which has been driven to the wall, insolvent
and bankrupt. The former is a banquet, and the latter a breadline. 158
Secondly, compared with railroad reorganizations, there are few
utility failures. Most railroads that fail are operating companies; the
big utility failures have been holding companies, such as the Insull
empire. The utility business has been extremely profitable, from the
income of operating companies. They have been riding a rising market
since their inception, and the trend is continuing. The railroads are
in no such position, nor is their future as secure. The utility problem
is to limit income to the rate of fair return-a stage-the railroads
passed long ago. The problem of the railroads today is to earn the
return they are legally entitled to, not to figure out some method of
keeping income down to the legal rate.
Finally, in the railroad industry the earning capacity of individual
156 Although the SEC is not bound by settled judicial precedents in evolving standards
of fairness and equity, SEC v. Chenery Corp., 317 U. S. 80 (1943), it has adhered firmly
to the absolute priority rule from the first, up to the United Light and Power case, Otis
& Con. SEC, 323 U. S. 624 (1945). See SEC report in the matter of Penn Timber Co.,
No. B-23063 (1939), and an article by Swaine discussing generally SEC philosophy,
Democratization of Corporate Reorganizations, 38 COL. L. Rav. 256 (1938). Rebutting
Swaine, see Weiner, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Reorganization, id. at 280.
157 PUHCA was passed by Congress to provide protection for investors in public
utilities and their subsidiaries. Creditors' rights were not the primary issue, as in § 77
reorganizations. See Note, Reorganizations Under Section 11 (g) of The Public Utility
Holding Company Act, 49 YALE L. J. 65 (1939). Cf. Dodd, Investor Protection by Admin.istrative Agency: The United States Securities and Exchange Commission, 5 MOD. L. REv.
174 (1942).

158 The strategic position of the common stock in a solvent company cannot be
ignored. Note, Recapitalizations Under Section 11 (e) of The Public Utility Holding
Company Act, 49 YALE L. J. 1297 (1940). This is surely another matter in railroad
bankruptcies. In voluntary reorganizations, preferred shareholders were given assurance
that some feasible method would be devised to protect their interest. 49 STAT. 814, 815 and
822 (1935), 15 U. S. C. §§ 79 f (a), 79 g and 79 k (e) (1946). See Note, Rights of
Cumulative Preferred Shareholders under PUHCA, 52 HiAv. L. RaV. 1331 (1939), indicating
SEC preference for common over preferred. However, once issuance of preferred is condoned, its rights will be protected. ICC exhibits no particular partiality in this respect.

WRECK OF THE OLD 77

1949]

roads shows enormous variations. At one end of the scale is the Pennsylvania, which, up to 1946, had showed a profit in every year of its
century-old history. 5 At the other end have been roads like the Erie,
the Rutland, and the Minneapolis & St. Louis, which have been in
more or less perpetual financial embarrassment. But rare indeed is
the utility that has failed to earn 5%o consistently. In the light of this,
the SEC would certainly be on much safer ground if it were to generalize
and formulate "rules" with respect to capitalization and participation
than the ICC in the case of the railroads.160
No really practical and useful purpose is achieved by comparing the
treatment of utility and rail shareholders. SEC policies will not affect
ICC treatment of rail equities.
The Role of Management
Management cannot be solely responsible for reorganizations. Berating management for past indiscretions and poor leadership may be
an interesting pastime, but hardly constructive. On the other hand, the
lack of foresight and mossbacked complacency of management that
grew, perhaps naturally, out of the monopoly enjoyed by rail transport
in past years, can lead only to further financial trouble. Commissioner Eastman once declared that .success will go to those who can
create new traffic by giving continually better service at lower prices. 6 '
Yet, for example, when buses dig into passenger traffic, many managements still respond by taking off more trains on the particular line,
increasing running time, and substituting older and older equipment.
This will guarantee further traffic going by highway.
Certainly the public relations end of the business cannot possibly
continue along past lines. President Barriger of the Monon put it
succinctly: "For too many years, the railroads have been merchandising their troubles rather than their services."' 6 2 Typical public re159 At the depth of the depression in 1933, Pennsy net income after charges was $17
million.

PENNSYLvANiA

RAILROAD 87TH ANNUAL REPORT (1933).

260 For a discussion of SEC policy toward the equity, see an excellent article by Dodd,
The Relative Rights of Preferred and Common Shareholders in Recapitalization Plans
Under The Holding Company Act, 57 HARv. L. Rxv. 295 (1944), analyzing a number of
utility cases.
On the issue of valuation of utility properties, see Note, Valuation by the SEC in Reorganizations, 55 IIARv. L. REv. 125 (1941). SEC considers going concern value, in contrast to the ICC, and determines such value by capitalizing prospective earnings at a rate
commensurate with the risk inherent in the enterprise, using as a basis past earnings
adjusted by any particular circumstances of present conditions.
On participation, see Note Determination of Common Share Participation in Plans
Under Section 11 (e) of The Public Utility Holding Company Act, 93 U. or PA. L. Rxv.
308 (1945).
161 Eastman, Transportation Problems and Suggestions Toward a Constructive Solution, 17 ACAD. POL. Scr. PRoc. 239 (1938).
162 Quoted in Railway Progress, May, 1947, p. 13.
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action is summed up by the remark of one man interviewed by a
reporter of the New York Herald Tribune and asked to comment on
the recent increase of rail fares, "We won't get anything for it. The
services will be the same. The airplanes give you real service for your
' 163
money.
What does this mean? It means that railroad equity holders might
better elect an aggressive management which can provide good service, and tap the traffic potential, instead of scrambling with the bondholders for a place at reorganizations. Archaic railroad management
and railroad reorganization have too often been consecutive chapters in
the same book.
New Legislation
For a considerable period of time it had been evident that Section
77 would be revised. It proved to be a fabulously costly and timeconsuming procedure, due largely to the administrative mechanics of
the section, resulting in the "ICC-court shuttle."' 64 Moreover, roads
in this form of. reorganization did not pay interest or principal on the
debt; it accrued. As a result of war-swollen earnings, several major
carriers found themselves with huge cash accumulations on handenough to pay the entire accrued interest, and, in the case of the New
Haven, the Chicago & North Western, 6 ' the Rock Island and the
Cotton Belt, certain maturities as well. The utterly absurd result was
reached of a road technically bankrupt in law but fully solvent in the
economic sense.' 6 Meanwhile, the reorganization plans had declared
the equity of no value, and it did not -participate in the distribution
of new securities. Stockholders and junior lienors foamed at the
mouth' 67 The upshot was the introduction of the Railroad Adjustment
Bill in 1947, support for which was apparently universal 68 This bill is
comprehensively analyzed elsewhere,' 69 and for the purpose of this discussion it will suffice to outline its major purpose only.
163 N. Y. Herald Tribune, July 13, 1947, p. 28.
164 Lisman, Railroad Reorganization and Section 77, 16 HARV. Bus. Rav. 24, 40 (1937).
165 While in bankruptcy, the Chicago and North Western was paying 62% on its
obligations and could not refund because of its entanglement in § 77, although it was
economically solvent. Concurrently, the Union Pacific was borrowing in the market at
2Y2%, although it was no more solvent than the North Western.
166 "Obviously, the primary purpose of debt readjustment is to so rearrange the debt
burden that new common may have a tangible equity value." Brooks, Railroad Reorganizations Under Section 77, 135 BANKER'S MAG. 503 (1937). This purpose is frustrated when
the shareholders' interest is declared valueless in the face of conditions where the road is
economically solvent although still in § 77.
167 The Commission was aware of this, but apparently turned a deaf ear. See 57
ICC ANx. REP. 74 (1943).
168 Suddenly the Commission favored legislation of this type. 59 ICC AxN. REP. 23, 24
(1945), 60 ICC ANN, . REP. 26 (1946).
169 For a comprehensive analysis, see Hand and Cummings, The Railroad Modification
Law, 48 CoL. L. REv. 689 (1948).
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The Act has two principal features: first, it provides that carriers
may alter the terms of their securities with the consent of 75% of each
class of security holder; secondly, it permits roads now in Section 77
proceedings to avail themselves of this new law. It expressly directs
that consideration shall be given to all past earnings (and other earnings) since the date of approval of the plan. Apparently there will be
no future repetition of overflowing coffers and technical bankruptcy.
Briefly, it is a composition statute. It permits a railroad that can see
financial difficulties ahead to alter and adjust its financial structure
by dealing on a business basis with the holders of the road's obligations. Creditors are often quite ready to do this. They dislike the
"cancerous morbidities" of receiverships or the elaborate, expensive,
and time-consuming procedures of Section 77, and the accompanying
moratorium on interest and principal payments. Rather elaborate safeguards are provided for the protection of persons affected, but dissident
minorities cannot use their position to hold up the majority by nuisance suits, the inevitable evil in the old equity receiverships and, by
incessant court appeals, as in the Section 77 procedure.
This is good legislation. Section 77 has failed dismally in one of its
most important objectives, i.e., speedy reorganization, and has proved
to be unwieldy in practice in numerous other respects. This Act benefits the equity, for in composition negotiations it is certain that the
equity, which initiates the adjustment offer, will not permit itself to be
eliminated. If the debt structure is in real need of drastic overhaul and
agreement cannot be reached with the creditors, Section 77 is still
available. Such situations are likely to be few and far between, however, in the light of the way junior creditors have fared in plans
under Section 77.
Provisions of the Act
Finally, on April 9, 1948, the second session of the 80th Congress
passed the bill as a new section of the Interstate Commerce Act,17 0
providing for a more simple, less expensive, and expeditious method of
effectuating modification of the financial structure of railroad corporations, and patterned on the so-called Chandler and McLaughlin Acts
(extending Chapter XV of the Bankruptcy Act).
Basically, its principal use will be to avoid the lengthy, cumbersome,
and expensive procedures of Section 77. It affords a means of bringing
up to date pertinent facts which affect changes in financial structures of
those railroads in Section 77 or in equity proceedings at the time of pass170 62 STAT. 163, 49 U. S. C. A. § 20b Supp. 1948.
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age of the bill. It is essentially a composition statute, enabling the roads
to deal with creditors on business basis. The new law will permit roads
to:
(1) Alter or modify, with the consent of the ICC, any provision of
any class or classes of its securities, and to alter or modify any mortgage
provisions underlying the securities, excepting only equipment trust
obligations. In practice, the carrier will apply to the Commission for
alteration. The ICC may require the applicant to secure assurances of
assent to the modification by holders of a percentage of the principal
amount or number of shares outstanding of the securities involved. A
public hearing is held, and all persons having an interest must be notified.
Before the ICC can give its approval, it must specifically find four
things: that the plan is within the scope of the new law; that it will be
in the public interest; that it will be in the best interests of the carrier, of
each class of its stockholders, and the holders of each class of bonds
affected; and/or, that it will not be adverse to the interests of any
creditor not affected by the modification. The Commission cannot consent to the plan unless at least 75% of each class of security holder has
approved it, whereupon it becomes binding on dissenters.
(2) Roads in Section 77 or equity receivership may avail themselves
of the provisions of the new law providing the property has not already
been sold, or the Section 77 plan finally consummated, and providing
that they comply with the carefully safeguarded procedural steps involved. These carriers must first apply to the court of proper jurisdiction for authority to avail themselves of the new law, and must show
that at least 25% of its outstanding securities are involved. The district
court has final authority to grant or deny the application; if it approves,
the reorganization proceedings are suspended until the ICC advises the
court that a voluntary plan has been approved or denied. The court
retains custody of the property, however, and the voluntary plan must
also be approved by the court after notice of the ICC's consent. If both
court and Commission OK the plan, the bankruptcy proceeding will be
terminated and the property returned to the debtor.
(3) The Act further provides that in any cases henceforth where a
carrier enters a Section 77 proceeding, anyone having an interest may, if
the plan has not already been confirmed (or where an appeal is pending
on the conlirmation order), petition either the court or the ICC to have
the ICC report to the court any changes, facts, or developments which
may have taken place since the plan was approved. The court may then
return the plan to the Commission in its discretion. If so, the Commis-
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sion, after hearing, may modify or refuse to modify the plan. In the
event of refusal, the court may uphold the ICC if it finds that the conclusions of the ICC are supported by the evidence. If, in the opinion of
the court, they are not, the plan goes back to the Commission and further consideration by that body, after which it is re-certified back to the
court. Thus the court has a wary eye on the proceedings at each step.
That part of the law permitting voluntary adjustment is satisfactory, I
believe. On the other hand, those provisions of the Act providing for
carriers now in Section 77 and those subsequently entering Section 77
(as in (3) above) have in them certain of the same pitfalls that are found
in the application and practice of Section 77 itself. I refer to the matter
of court approval of each step, the certifying and re-certifying. The
Senate report stated that the committee did not "intend that the plan
shall become a football between the Commission and the courts; it believes that while courts will give due weight to the facts as ascertained
by the Commission, the Commission will also respect the judgment of
the courts, particularly in view of the fact that in these cases the court
has custody of the property and is intimately familiar with the pertinent
facts."17' 1 This declaration has a wonderful sound to it, but the preaching and the practice are frequently two different matters. The fact remains that in a sense there is the same divided jurisdiction as obtained
in Section 77. Concededly, the provisions of the new act are far superior
to the old procedure of Section 77 in this respect, for the opportunity
for the disgruntled to appeal incessantly no longer exists. Moreover, the
composition process itself tends to accelerate procedure rather than
lengthen it as an involuntary bankruptcy inevitably does. The court has
what might be termed a veto power over a Commission plan in these
instances, enabling it only to refer the plan back to the ICC but precluding it from substituting its judgment on the merits for that of the
Commission. Nonetheless, should the court and the ICC happen to have
differing opinions as to what constituted sufficiency of evidence to sustain the Commission's findings, there would be no limitation on the number of times the plan might go back and forth.
The real significance of this legislation lies in the composition provision itself. The provisions relating to roads now in Section 77 will
shortly become inapplicable once those carriers get back on their feet.
The provision for transferring from future Section 77 proceedings to
the voluntary method will not, in all probability, have much usage since,
assuming the voluntary reorganization procedure is used as it is in171 SEN. R P. No. 897, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1948).

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 34

tended to be used, future Section 77 proceedings ought to be few and
far between.
This law will currently affect about fifteen carriers, mostly small
ones, now in reorganization under Section 77, where the plans have not
yet been confirmed, and about six small roads undergoing equity proceedings, providing any of these carriers avail themselves of the new
provisions. In the future, the new section will affect any carrier whose
financial structure appears to be shaky. It seems certain that all concerned would prefer a "renegotiation" of securities to the bitter struggle through Section 77. In any event, the absurd situation of financially solvent but technically bankrupt properties will be definitely out
of the picture. Further, the shareholders will be able to face financial
difficulties without the fear of losing their shirts. Any plan instigated
at the behest of the equity will include participation by the equity, and,
even if the carrier is now under Section 77, the provision for transfer
to the voluntary proceeding, plus the requirement that a Commission
take changed conditions into consideration, augurs well for a more
reasonable treatment of the share interest.
One problem remains to be answered: what of the road with a topheavy capitalization that cannot make ends meet as a result? Is there
any means whereby the financial structure can be pruned down to a
manageable size? Yes, there is, but it must be remembered that any
road in this condition is inevitably going to be faced with painful surgery-Section 77 again. By refusing to assent 'to a voluntary plan, the
Commission can, in effect, force the carrier into the old method. In this
manner the water can be squeezed out, if indeed this is the situation,
for the court would uphold the Commission's refusal if there was evidence in support of the finding.
This, then, is the law that wrecked Section 77. The average small
investor in railroad securities emerges from the wreckage, a gleam of
survival in his eye. True to form, he is bloody, but unbowed.

.
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